NUCLEAR FACILITIES AND TERRORISM

An INEA executive statement by
Dave Rossin
Assisted by

Gerald Clark, Jorge Spitalnik, Robert Nickell., Dan Meneley, Manning Muntzing, Bertrand Barre, Walter Kato and several others

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SUMMARY

QUESTIONS THAT ARE ASKED ABOUT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS:

• What could terrorists do to nuclear power plants, spent fuel storage or fuel cycle facilities?

• Could terrorists cause the release of radioactivity?

• What harm could come to individuals or populations from
  radioactivity released or spread by terrorists?

We have chosen to discuss these questions to provide a sound overview for people to consider.

The brief answers to our questions are:

• While actual damage would be hard to inflict, facilities would be forced to shut down for inspection and damage assessment, and might be kept down for extended periods for political re-examination of policy issues.

• It is very unlikely that any significant amounts of radioactivity would be released.

• It is hard to imagine any way for actual harm to come to either individuals or populations from radioactivity.

In summary, our examination of these questions leads to an important finding: Public confusion and even panic could pose far greater risks than physical damage to facilities or actual dangers from potential exposure of people to radiation.

MAIN PAPER

After 9/11 there was a rush of TV and newspaper reports about important places and their potential vulnerability to terrorist attacks. Typically, statements included concern about the ability of nuclear power plants to withstand terrorist attacks, from World Trade Center-type airplane strikes to assaults by trained and heavily-armed cadres.

Expert statements in response were often met with skepticism, but the facts and engineering realities are very clear: nuclear plants represent hardened targets and already had strong security forces in place.

The charge was made that nuclear plants were not designed for such attacks. They were not. That concept was not in the minds of the designers and regulators. Their objective was to keep radioactivity and contamination WITHIN the facility in the event of an accident.

After 9/11, analysts re-examined the designs of nuclear plant systems and structures. The major design criterion that contributes to the ruggedness of the reinforced containment buildings that surround the primary reactor system is the requirement to withstand internal pressure during an accident without leakage. This ruggedness enables reinforced concrete containment structures to protect against winds of up to 300 miles per hour, a telephone pole or tree as a missile carried by such a hurricane or tornado, and flammable liquids such as gasoline or oil.

The barriers to protect against radiation releases have proved to be very robust. An attack that could damage auxiliary equipment or electrical switchyards would be a serious matter, but the reactors were designed for safe shutdown even if these systems were lost.

During the mid-1970’s, the U.S. AEC initiated classified studies on the potential for sabotage at commercial nuclear power plants. The work was done at Sandia Laboratories with teams of engineers with nuclear plant design and operating experience working alongside weapons designers and top security experts.

The studies showed that even if knowledgeable insiders could disable key safety equipment, redundant systems would provide backup protection. In scenarios where all engineered safety systems were ruined, there was still a period of hours to take corrective actions before onset of core damage.

The containment structure is the outer plant barrier of defense-in-depth. Major damage to massive walls and pipes would have to be caused before radiation could be released outside the containment building.

As a result of these and other studies, recommendations were made that added to defense against both external and internal threats. An example is the "two-man rule" that precludes a single individual from being in the containment alone and possibly out of sight of a person or tele-monitors.

The analysts also noted that the larger the number of adversaries in the scenario, the higher the likelihood of detection and neutralization. Intelligence services of nations have a better chance of discovering plots, especially now that they are better prepared and supported. The AEC followed the study with extensive regulations that required hardened guard positions, weapons training and security fences.

In 2002 the Nuclear Energy Institute requested the Electric Power Research Institute to study the potential damage that could be caused by deliberately crashing a large commercial jet airplane into containment structures at nuclear power plants, as in a World Trade Center scenario.

Detailed structural analyses showed that a direct strike by either the fuselage or an engine would not breach or perforate post-tensioned or reinforced containment walls except at unrealistically high impact velocities. Through-wall penetration was found for reinforced concrete shield buildings on the exterior of free-standing steel containment structures, but no subsequent failure of the steel shell was shown.

Penetration of other, less rugged structures, such as BWR reactor buildings, auxiliary buildings, and diesel-generator buildings causes extensive dispersal of jet fuel and fire damage. However, even penetration and fire damage should not prevent safe shutdown.

[An unclassified press release on the NEI/EPRI study was issued in January 2003, and excerpts were published in the February 2003 issue of Nuclear News. The work was presented to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff in December 2002 and to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards in June 2003.]

In the 1980’s Canada’s Ontario Hydro Co. studied the possible effects of crashing a 747 into a containment building at a commercial CANDU reactor. A perfect hit was assumed, with all four engines impacting the building at the same time. The analysis showed that although there would be some concrete spallation off the inside of the walls, but no building penetration would occur.

After 9/1l, several nuclear adversary groups published articles which claimed that spent fuel storage pools would be vulnerable to aircraft attack. In fact, some pools are covered by light structures. While roofs could be destroyed, the pools themselves have very thick reinforced concrete walls. These walls are generally behind other large structures like water storage tanks and equipment bays, and would be very difficult to breach. The pool water above the stored spent fuel is 10 to 20 feet deep, and would deaden the impact of debris falling from overhead.

Safety of spent fuel in a storage pool depends on keeping the fuel under water. Draining of pool water is extremely unlikely, and there are many actions that could be taken to pump more water into a pool, if that should ever become necessary.

The conclusion of the sabotage work and of numerous other studies on accidents and attacks on power reactors is that while not impossible, the likelihood of actual release of a significant amount of radioactivity is extremely low. Thus, the probability of actual radiation exposure to members of the public from a terrorist attack or sabotage is also extremely low. Nevertheless, it is widely recognized that any attack on a nuclear facility would result in sensational news reporting and front page media attention.

The actions of the 9/11 suicide terrorists served warning that nuclear facilities should be re-examined for new types of threats. Additional physical barriers, detection equipment and inspection procedures for incoming trucks and other shipments have been added. Personnel security has been upgraded. Guard forces now have night detection equipment, more advanced weapons and more intense training.

These technical discussions refer specifically to licensed U. S. water-cooled power reactors. Many power reactors in other nations comply with criteria based on USNRC regulations. Other designs including Soviet-design reactors have been examined on a case-by-case basis. Security has become a higher priority at every nuclear station around the world. Although information is not public, threat reduction technology and training suitable to specific plants and sites have been upgraded.

The IAEA and WANO provide advice and assistance; however each nation is responsible for the safety and security of its own facilities. Since 9/11, managers of power reactors, as well as bridges, dams and tall buildings all over the world, have re-examined and strengthened their security programs.

Operation and Security:

All nuclear power plants are required to have security plans. Security personnel are trained to operate detection and surveillance systems, to handle firearms, and to understand directions and orders of security managers. New and more rigorous training programs have been developed and are being conducted at all plants.

A basic principle of security planning is secrecy of the plan itself is that plans cannot be published or released to members of the public. Only properly authorized persons should have access to security plans, and in some cases, only to the portions of the plans they need to know. Success of security may turn on the potential adversary not being sure of, or even aware of, fundamental aspects of plans. There is no justification for exceptions to this policy, even in the case of nuclear power plants for which the tradition has been to include public participation in the licensing process.

Communications plans are vital elements of an emergency plan. These plans are the vehicles for setting up cooperation between state, county and local jurisdictions, law-enforcement departments, the NRC, FBI, the Coast Guard and the Department of Homeland Security.

The 9/1l events have led to increased requirements for emergency drills. Drills are designed to test communications links, familiarity with emergency plan steps and requirements, and the ability of various administrative entities to work together.

Drills are designed by experts to challenge participants. Rather than being just walk-throughs of pre-planned steps, drills are designed to find weaknesses and failures, and to fix them. A headline about a facility having "failures" in emergency exercises really means that drills are working, lessons will be learned, and improvements will be made.

The US NRC has initiated a pilot program with a number of United States nuclear utilities to develop and test force-on-force drills which simulate an attack on a plant by a highly armed terrorist group. These drills not only test training and compliance with regulations, but contacts with local, regional and state law enforcement agencies, officials and the media. The purpose is to find problems and areas of improvement before these teams are ever needed.

The nuclear power industry is the only private-sector entity that undergoes these kinds of exercises and security requirements. While expensive, they add to deterrence of attacks. Any adversary sophisticated enough to plan an armed attack would know that the chances of causing damage would be very small, and the risks of being thwarted or killed before reaching the plant are serious.

Pathways for Releases of Radiation

Real danger to members of the public would have to involve the dispersal of radioactive material. We have argued above that a terrorist attack is unlikely to result in any significant release of radioactive material, certainly nothing on the scale of Chernobyl, or even Windscale.

These releases were caused by design characteristics and equipment problems, and further actions of operators and managers, not from any external attack. And despite the extensive publicity about radiation, the only deaths from the Chernobyl accident were plant workers. A number of thyroid cancers have been detected in children due to drinking of local cows milk. These cases have been treated successfully, according to IAEA studies.

In the event of an actual radiation release, data from radiation detectors and modeling of wind and other weather conditions would be used to predict where and when any members of the public might be exposed. Most likely, members of the public would be best protected in the short term by remaining in their homes. Sheltering would best be achieved by staying inside a building, and that would certainly minimize the chance of breathing any contaminated air.

Experts, both on radiation and on personal behavior, warn that the greatest risk would come from the possibility of panic. An attempt by a lot of people to evacuate a particular area in panic could result in accidents, fights, heart attacks, and more panic. Panic makes honest and verifiable reporting extremely important.

For this reason, current emergency plans emphasize the need for nuclear plant managers to work with the local media in advance to build a better understanding of radiation hazard in terms of familiar immediate and long-term risks. Likewise, national and international nuclear organizations are strengthening their efforts to communicate effectively and to establish communication channels to major news outlets and organizations.

Low Doses of Radiation and International Standards

We live in a world where there is a small amount of background of radiation all the time. It comes from the Sun, from the earth’s crust, and building materials. In the extended debate about nuclear power, the subject of effects on health from low additional doses of radiation has been confusing and even frightening to some people.

Calculations of the possible effects of tiny additional amounts of radiation, similar to and often within the margins of variation of natural background levels, have been used to project the incidence of deadly cancers in a population. The theory is simple and the numbers are easy to calculate. The maximum theoretical numbers of cancers have often been turned into headlines. However, most experts recognize that these predicted numbers of cancers are not real. In fact, the generally used theory predicts a maximum theoretical number of cancer cases for an exposed population, and then states that the actual number is somewhere between that number and zero, and for low individual doses, it is most likely zero.

Public Communication and the News Media

It is impossible to overstate the importance of public understanding of nuclear power issues, of radiation and of threats from terrorism. Much of the present negative impression people have about radioactivity and nuclear power stems from our own failure as scientists and engineers, despite decades of effort, to build a broad public understanding of the basic scientific facts about radiation.

That is why we believe it is important to work with journalists, local and national press, TV news producers and writers, and with interested elected representatives and their staffs. As more people with public responsibilities become better informed about radiation, safety and security, they will be able to ask the right questions and evaluate the answers they get.

Then there is hope that if a terrorist attack ever occurs on a nuclear facility, the public is more likely to be better served with facts rather than sensational headlines.

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THIS IS AN EXECUTIVE STATEMENT OF THE INEA

in collaboration with the International Nuclear Societies’ Council.

It represents the views of the author but has been endorsed by the Executive Committee of the Academy as a contribution to the responsible development of civil nuclear energy.